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SUMMARYThe evolution of global current account imbalances, especially the huge and
growing US current account deficit, has been the most alarming global economic develop-
ment in recent years.  So far, European policymakers seem to have watched the growing
imbalances without much concern, in the hope that the EU will be largely unaffected by
the inevitable correction of the US external deficit. This apparent complacency is unwar-
ranted. Europe may not be part of the global current account problem, but it is bound to
be part of the solution. The US current account deficit must narrow eventually and this
process will almost certainly involve a significant depreciation in the dollar. The more
stubbornly Asian countries refuse to adjust their exchange rates and current account sur-
pluses, the larger will be the appreciation of the euro and the resulting deterioration in the
euro area’s current account balance.The sharper the adjustment and the larger the
share of this adjustment that falls on Europe, the greater the risk of deflationary
pressures and a severe recession in the euro area.
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To prepare for global current account adjustment,
Europe should adopt a policy of risk management.
The domestic macroeconomic consequences of
adjustment will be less severe if policies aimed at
creating more flexible markets are introduced,
especially in the services sector. Fiscal policy can
cushion some of the shock to aggregate demand
that will accompany adjustment. To facilitate this,
European governments should now be striving to
improve fiscal positions. Finally, the ECB should
make it clear that it would respond to deflationary
pressures by easing monetary policy significantly,
thus avoiding the risk of deflationary expectations
thatmight raise the cost of adjustment even further.
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UNLIKE their counterparts in the
US, policymakers in Europe don’t
appear to be losing much sleep
about global current account
imbalances. That may be about to
change. As the US external deficit
continues its steep decent into
uncharted waters, there may be
many sleepless nights ahead for
policymakers everywhere in the
world.
There has been a great
deal of discussion
recently of global cur-
rent account imbalan-
ces that has served to
clarify many of the
major issues.  The first
section summarises
our reading of the cur-
rent consensus. The
arguments in it do not
depend, by and large,
on the more controversial ques-
tions surrounding the factors dri-
ving these imbalances – these
are discussed in Section 2. In
Section 3, we discuss the key
choices facing Europe in pre-
paring for and dealing with
the eventual adjustment.  
1. WHAT WE KNOW
During the 1960s and 1970s, the
US current account remained
fairly close to balance. The chart
below illustrates the substantial
deficit that emerged in the early
1980s, but by the end of the
decade the US external position
had returned to around balance.
The first half of the
1990s saw the US run
moderate current
account deficits. Since
1997, however, the
deficit has ballooned
to unprecedented
levels, driven by a dra-
matic deterioration in
the trade balance. By
the second quarter of
2005, the current
account deficit had
widened to 6.3 per cent of GDP
and showed no signs of bot-
toming out.
To finance ongoing current
account deficits, the US must bor-
row from the rest of the world. This
adds to US net external liabilities,
which have risen from less than 3
per cent of GDP in 1990 to a fore-
casted 25 per cent of GDP in
2005.  
In thinking about how the US
external position will evolve going
forward, several key points are
widely accepted:
First, the trend of rising US net
external liabilities relative to GDP
cannot continue forever (see Box
1). As Herbert Stein, chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisers
under Presidents Nixon and Ford,
famously remarked, “That which
cannot go on forever won’t.” A
continuously rising ratio of net
external liabilities to GDP would
eventually see the burden of ser-
vicing these liabilities becoming
unbearably large. Anticipating
this, foreign investors will grow
increasingly reluctant to continue
to lend to the US even before this
happens. Foreign investors may
even retreat from lending to the
US much earlier, if they regard the
proportion of dollar assets in their
portfolios as becoming too large rela-
tive to assets in other currencies.
“Since 1997,
the deficit has
ballooned to
unprecedented
levels.”
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BOX 1: 
SOME CURRENT ACCOUNT ARITHMETIC
At some stage, the ratio of net external liabilities to GDP must sta-
bilise. It is reasonable to assume that the long-run rate of return
on US net external liabilities roughly equals the long-run rate of
growth of US GDP. It then follows that stabilisation in the ratio of
net external liabilities to GDP requires that the US trade deficit
eventually narrow to near zero. 
As the current account also includes net interest payments on
foreign liabilities as well as net transfer payments, a near-zero
trade balance implies a moderate current account deficit.  The pre-
cise size of this sustainable current account deficit depends on
the level at which the ratio of net external liabilities to GDP even-
tually stabilises.  In turn, this level depends on when the adjust-
ment process begins.
Formally, growth in US net external liabilities can be described by
the equation NFLt+1= (1+r)NFLt+ TBt, where NFLt is the level of
net foreign liabilities, r is the rate of return on these net liabilities,
and TBtis the trade balance plus net foreign transfers.  Let x
denote the growth rate of GDP, so that GDPt+1= (1+x)GDPt.  Under
the assumption that r = x, stabilisation in the ratio of net external
liabilities to GDP at level d (that is, NFLt+1/GDPt+1= NFLt/GDPt= d)
requires TBt= 0 and CA/GDP = -rd. 
Second, US current account
adjustment will almost certainly
involve a significant real deprecia-
tion in the dollar. Given that the
responsiveness of US exports and
imports to changes in the real
exchange rate is relatively small,
substantial real dollar deprecia-
tion, perhaps in the range 20-40
per cent, will be required to shrink
the US trade deficit
1. 
Moreover, with US imports now 70
per cent larger than exports,
exports need to grow at a rate
nearly twice as fast as imports to
prevent the trade deficit from
widening further.  In other words,
the gap between imports and
exports has grown so large that a
dramatic acceleration in exports
is necessary if exports are to
catch up. In this regard it is telling
that the 3 per centage point swing
in the current account balance in
the late 1980s came with a real
depreciation of the dollar of 30
per cent (Charts 1 and 2).
Some have argued that a reduc-
tion in the US fiscal deficit can
bring about current account
adjustment without a need for
dollar depreciation.  This argu-
ment, however, ignores the fact
Source: Federal Reserve Board
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1Estimates of the
responsiveness of
exports and imports
are taken from Chinn
(2005). Estimates
of the amount of dol-
lar depreciation that
may be required to
bring about adjust-
ment are from
Blanchard, Giavazzi
and Sa (2005) and
Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2004).b
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that the restraining effects of fis-
cal contraction on US imports
would be only temporary.
Moreover, the US Federal Reserve
would respond to a cyclical down-
turn resulting from fiscal adjust-
ment by lowering interest rates,
thereby putting downward pres-
sure on the dollar.      
Third, the longer current account
adjustment is delayed, the more
pronounced will be the deprecia-
tion of the dollar. According to
some estimates, if adjustment
started today, a cumulative real
decline in the dollar of roughly 30
per cent over the next three years
would put the US current account
balance on a sustainable path. If
adjustment were delayed for a
decade, however, a drop in the dol-
lar of more than 50 per cent would
be required
3.  
In the meantime, the rest of the
world will continue to accumulate
dollar assets at an unpreceden-
ted pace. Essentially all of these
effects of a disorderly correction
would be even greater.  Such a
scenario would not only involve
an abrupt drop in the dollar, but
would also see surging US interest
rates, falling US stock prices, and
weaker economic activity in the
United States.  The effects would
probably spill over into financial
markets in other countries, drag-
ging down asset prices in Europe
and elsewhere.
The counterpart of the large and
growing US current account defi-
cit is a large and growing current
account surplus in the rest of the
world.  As shown in Table 2, some
of the largest surpluses in recent
years have been recorded in Asia,
especially in Japan and China.
Surpluses have risen sharply in
the major oil-exporting countries
over recent years as a result of
higher global oil prices.  The euro
area continues to run moderate
current account surpluses.
The ongoing elevated level of glo-
bal oil prices has shifted some of
the rest of the world’s
current account sur-
plus away from Asia
towards net oil expor-
ters. To the extent that
the oil-exporting coun-
tries have lower pro-
pensities to save than
economies in Asia, this
shift may bring about
a faster decline in
savings in the rest of
the world.  As a result,
current account adjustment may
come earlier.  
1Norway, Venezuela,
Algeria, Gabon,
Nigeria, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, UAE,
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq,
Qatar, Russia.
2IMF Forecast
3See Cline  (2005)
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assets are denominated or priced
in dollars. A fourth key point is
that when adjustment eventually
occurs, holders of dollar assets in
the rest of the world will suffer
negative wealth
effects. The rest of
the world held about
$9,300 billion of
gross dollar assets
at the end of 2004.
As shown in Table 1,
the euro area’s hol-
dings amounted to
nearly $3,000 bil-
lion, equivalent to
about one-third of
euro area GDP. If
adjustment started today, depre-
ciation in the dollar of 30 per cent
would imply a loss of wealth for
the rest of the world equal to
nearly 10 per cent of rest-of-the-
world GDP.  The hit to euro area
wealth would be of a similar order,
relative to GDP.
These numbers assume an
orderly adjustment. The wealth
TABLE 1.                        NON-US HOLDINGS OF DOLLAR ASSETS ($bn)
2000 2002 2004
Euro Area 1,845 2,237 2,961
Asia 1,219 1,567 2,421
Japan 750 940 1,373
China 172 270 434
Major Oil Exporters
1 105 165 267
TABLE 2.                           CURRENT ACCOUNT  BALANCES ($bn) 
1995 2002 2005
2
United States -114 -475 -759
Euro Area 49 49 24
Asia 72 244 341
Japan 111 113 153
China 2 35 116
Major Oil Exporters
1 8 92 398
Source: BEA and US Treasury
Source: IMF 
“Holders of dol-
lar assets in the
rest of the world
will suffer nega-
tive wealth
effects”vely small, albeit growing, shares
of their total portfolios in the form
of US assets.  We estimate that
the US share in foreign portfolios
is currently around 15 per cent
3.
However, US assets
make up at least 40
per cent of global
financial assets.  In
fact, the  rise in the
dollar over recent
months strongly
suggests that the
US is facing few
problems funding
its current account
deficit. This means
that it may be
some time before
things turn sour. It is important to
use this time effectively to pre-
pare for a smooth adjustment.
How long can global
current account imba-
lances continue? The
answer to this ques-
tion depends crucially
on what factors are
driving these imbalan-
ces. One view is that
the US current
account deficit
reflects a large US
capital account sur-
plus, due to capital
inflows from abroad.
This “capital-flows” or “global-
saving-glut”
4 view points to the
high level of national savings
abroad, especially in Asia, as the
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2. WHAT WE DON’T KNOW 
So much for what we know. What
no one knows at this stage is
when adjustment will begin and
how fast it will be. It may begin
soon or it may not start for quite
some time. It may be sharp, cau-
sing large economic disruptions
for the main trading partners of
the US, or smooth, facilitating
similarly smooth adjustments in
their economies.
The burden of servicing its net
external liabilities does not
appear currently to be a problem
for the US. Rates of return on both
foreign assets and liabilities
have been low over recent years,
muting the effect on investment
income of the excess of liabilities
over assets.
However, with US
interest rates
rising, and with a
growing stock of
external liabilities,
US net investment
income is projec-
ted to turn nega-
tive in the near
future.
Similarly, there is
little evidence to
suggest that
foreign investors are becoming
satiated with US assets.  Most
countries in the world hold relati-
factor responsible for the trade
deficit. Asian countries seem
hungry for dollar assets as they
desire to rebuild - and even
expand beyond - the net foreign
asset positions they
enjoyed before the
financial crises of the
late 1990s, in order
to protect themselves
against future finan-
cial turbulences and
dependence on IMF
support. 
Furthermore, these
countries face gro-
wing demographic
problems. Given the
absence of well-developed social
security systems in most Asian
countries except Japan, they
may want to accumulate net
foreign assets as a source of
income for their rapidly ageing
populations. If this is the case,
the US is just supplying the
assets that Asians want, and this
arrangement could go on for
some time with no need for an
immediate, sharp adjustment.
Eventually, however, the “capital-
flows” view suggests that the US
capital account will have to
balance and the current account
with it. 
The alternative to the “capital-
flows” view is that the US current
account imbalance is driven by
trade flows. Under this “trade-
flows” view,  the overvalued dollar
and robust economic growth in
the US relative to the rest of the
world have boosted US imports
and depressed US exports. This
view differs from the “capital-
flows” view mainly in that it sug-
gests there is no reason why the
rest of the world will continue to
finance this deficit for an exten-
ded period of time. Under this
view, therefore, the need for an
1A negative figure
means that the
region in the left-
hand column ran a
deficit with the
region in the row.
2Includes Hong Kong.
3Based on Cline
(2005).
4See  Bernanke
(2005)
“It may be some
time before
things turn sour.
It is important to
use this time
effectively.”
TABLE 3.                   2004 BILATERAL TRADE BALANCE
1 ($bn)
EU China
2 Major Oil Exporters
United States -96 -162 -86
EU -87 -82
China 1
Major Oil Exporters
Source: BEA, Eurostat and own estimates.
“The US may just
be supplying the
assets that
Asians want.”GLOBAL CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES: HOW TO MANAGE THE RISK FOR EUROPE
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adjustment in current account
imbalances may arise soon and
fast. 
If global current account adjust-
ment were to start today, a narro-
wing of the US trade deficit to
about zero would imply a contrac-
tion of US net exports of roughly
$700 billion at an annual rate.
The flip side of this adjustment is
that the rest of the world’s trade
surplus with the United States
would necessarily shrink by
$700 billion. As shown in Table 3
on the previous page, the US runs
large bilateral trade deficits with
China, Europe, and the major oil
exporting countries.  Europe’s
trade surplus with regards to the
US of $96 billion in 2004 was
almost offset by Europe’s $87
billion deficit vis-à-
vis China.  
To get a feel for the
magnitude of the
adjustment, let us
assume that the
burden of adjust-
ment is shared
equally among
Asia, Europe, and
the major oil expor-
ting countries. This
would imply a
decline in
European net
exports of $233 bil-
lion, equivalent to
about 2 per cent of EU-15 GDP.
As already discussed, the closing
of the US trade deficit requires a
depreciation of the real effective
exchange rate of the dollar (a
weighted average of bilateral real
exchange rates). The key factor
determining how the burden of
adjustment is shared across
countries will be movements in
these bilateral exchange rates.  
It follows from this that:
 The more the Asian economies
remain hardnosed and peg their
currencies to the dollar, the more
the euro will have to appreciate
and therefore the greater the dete-
rioration in the European trade
balance. 
 If the Asian economies allow
their currencies to appreciate,
Asia’s trade surplus would decline
and relatively little of the adjust-
ment burden might fall on Europe.
 A pick-up in investment or a
decline in saving rates in Asia
would reduce Asia’s demand for
US assets. Conversely, a pick-up in
US national saving, by closing the
budget deficit and increasing hou-
sehold saving, would reduce the
US demand for borrowing from the
rest of the world. Both would put
downward pressure
on the dollar and
upward pressure on
the Asian currencies,
again perhaps with
little effect on Europe.
 A switch in Asia
from a dollar-domina-
ted portfolio strategy
to a strategy of
buying euro assets
would result in an
appreciation in the
euro and put a heavy
share of the adjust-
ment burden on the
euro area economies.
Unfortunately, the benign scena-
rios for Europe depend on most of
the adjustment occurring in the
US and Asia; Europe can do little to
make that happen.
3.KEY CHOICES FOR EUROPE &
THE EURO AREA
In view of the inevitable adjust-
ment, European policymakers
face four key policy questions:  
1.What exchange rate policy in
Asia would be best for Europe?
2.Should Europe welcome the
euro becoming an international
reserve currency?
3.How can policy promote the
smooth reallocation of resour-
ces?
4.What are the implications for
monetary and fiscal policy?
CHINA’S EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
Since adjustment will involve
depreciation in the US real effec-
tive exchange rate, the question
arises: to what extent will govern-
ments in Asia allow their curren-
cies to appreciate? Especially
important in this regard is China’s
exchange rate regime.
China in particular has pegged its
currency firmly to the US dollar
for many years. In July 2005, the
renminbi was allowed to appre-
ciate about 2 per cent, and has
been stable since. China’s
government announced that, in
the future, it would peg to a bas-
ket of currencies, but the exact
composition of this basket
remains unspecified.
Future adjustments in China’s
exchange rate policy have two
dimensions that are relevant for
Europe. One is the level of the
exchange rate. The more the ren-
minbi is allowed to appreciate
against the dollar, the larger the
part of the US current account
adjustment that falls on the trade
flows between China and the US,
“The benign 
scenarios for
Europe depend on
most of the
adjustment ocur-
ring in the US
and Asia; Europe
can do little to
make that 
happen.”GLOBAL CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES: HOW TO MANAGE THE RISK FOR EUROPE
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will influence the attractive-
ness of euro assets for Asian
investors. In the past,
European governments have
been quick to call for exchange
rate depreciations in the face
of current account deficits,
fearing that such deficits
might result in the
loss of jobs in Europe.
The “capital-flows”
view implies that clo-
sing the US current
account deficit requi-
res either an increase
in US national
savings, or a decline
in Asian national
savings, or that Asian
countries switch from
a dollar-dominated
portfolio strategy to a strategy
of buying euro assets.
European policy
can do nothing
about the first two,
but it can do some-
thing to make
euro-denominated
assets more
attractive for Asian
investors.
Increasing produc-
tivity in Europe
would be a step in
the right direction. 
Reserve currency
status promises
revenues resulting from the
global use of a currency, but it
would also expose the euro to
potentially large and volatile
shifts in the international
demand for liquidity, which
would result in higher
exchange rate volatility. In the
past, the Bundesbank was
always reluctant to accept
that. It is not clear whether the
ECB will be more inclined to
tolerate more volatility.  
RESOURCE REALLOCATION
A third set of policy choices
concern how to facilitate the real-
location of resources that real
exchange rate adjustment will
necessitate. Drawing on the
example presented earlier,
adjustment that would cause
European net exports to contract
€233 billion would result in more
than 3 million job losses in
Europe’s traded goods sector. If
these displaced workers were not
able to find new jobs in the non-
traded sector, the average EU-15
unemployment rate would jump
to 9 per cent from 7.5 per cent
today, increasing the fiscal bur-
den of unemployment accordin-
gly. To keep unemployment from
rising, significant resources
would need to shift from the tra-
ded goods sector to the non-tra-
ded sector. In order to promote a
smooth realloca-
tion of resources,
policymakers in
Europe need to
do more to libera-
lise credit and
labour markets.
In this regard,
further liberalisa-
tion of the servi-
ces sector is cru-
cial.
These reforms
would also help
to boost poten-
tial growth in Europe.  A lasting
correction of global current
account imbalances is likely to
require an improvement in
European potential growth, not
just a cyclical pick-up of
European growth above potential
and an associated temporary
boost to imports from the US.
Stronger domestic demand in the
form of business investment
should also contribute to higher
potential growth.  Rising net
b
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and the less need there is for
adjustment between the US and
Europe. The other dimension is
the exchange rate regime. The
more the Chinese peg shifts from
the dollar to the euro, the more
China will become a net buyer of
euro assets. This is likely to result
in a euro area
current account
deficit vis-à-vis
China, and an
appreciation of
the euro’s real
exchange rate,
thereby weake-
ning euro area
exports. Europe
therefore has a
clear interest in a
significant
appreciation of
the renminbi against the dollar,
but not in an increase in the
euro’s share in the currency bas-
ket to which the Chinese peg
their currency.      
RESERVE CURRENCY STATUS
A significant and lasting increase
in the euro’s share in the cur-
rency baskets that China and
other Asian countries peg to, and
in their asset portfolios, would
certainly give a boost to the
euro’s position as a global
reserve currency. The second key
question is whether Europeans
are willing to let that happen,
given that it would imply large
and lasting current account defi-
cits of the euro area with regards
to Asia as it absorbs the excess
savings coming from that region.
This question does not arise with
the “trade-flows” view, because
under that view there is no
choice: the euro area’s current
account will move into deficit no
matter what. Under the “capital-
flows” view, it is an issue because
European reactions to a decline in
Europe’s current account balance
“Europe therefore
has a clear interest
in a significant
appreciation of the
renminbi against
the dollar.”
“ In order to promote
a smooth realloca-
tion of resources,
policymakers in
Europe need to do
more to liberalise
credit and labour
markets. ”GLOBAL CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES: HOW TO MANAGE THE RISK FOR EUROPE
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financial inflows into Europe, as
net inflows to the US decline,
would provide financing for this
additional investment. Moreover,
higher real consumption in
Europe would have positive
effects on European consumers. 
FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY
Finally, the real exchange rate is
what matters for adjustment, but
monetary policy can only have
an effect for a limited period at
best when prices are rigid. It is
therefore not clear that the ECB
should be taking any steps at
present to address global cur-
rency imbalances, other than
monitoring developments clo-
sely.
However, the ECB should stand
ready to loosen monetary policy
promptly and aggressively
should a sharp adjustment occur
that threatens to result in defla-
tionary pressures in the euro
area. Even before
that happens, the
ECB should be open
and clear about its
determination to
act promptly in
order to prevent a
risk of deflationary
expectations emer-
ging in the face of a
significant weake-
ning of the dollar.
A fiscal expansion
in Europe can miti-
gate the effects of the decline in
aggregate demand resulting from
the US current account adjust-
ment. But to facilitate this
without endangering the sustai-
nability of public finances in the
EU countries, governments
should move their budgets to
balance or small surpluses now.
An additional benefit
of these sound poli-
cies would be to
make European
assets more attrac-
tive to Asian inves-
tors.
By following these
recommendations,
European policyma-
kers will be taking out
an insurance policy
that will help Europe
avoid a major downturn should the
US experience abrupt current
account adjustment. Prudent peo-
ple buy insurance.  Given the magni-
tude of the imbalances, policyma-
kers in Europe need to act quickly.   
“The ECB should
stand ready to
loosen monetary
policy promptly
and aggressively.” 
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